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GOSSIP AND METAPHYSICS: THE PERSONAL
TURN IN JURISPRUDENTIAL WRITING
Michael Ansaldi*

P ATIERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE. By Neil Duxbury. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1995. Pp. viii, 520. $49.95.
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE. By
John Henry Schlegel. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press. 1995. Pp. xii, 418. $55.

[D]emocracy must be founded ... on a faith that in the long run ideas
are more important than the men who form them.
- Lon L. Fuller1
I like persons better than principles, and I like persons with no principles better than anything else in the world.
- Oscar Wtlde2

The Franco-Rumanian existentialist E.M. Cioran once opined
that the two most interesting things in this world are gossip and
metaphysics.3 For those so minded - and I confess I am among
them - the combined prospect of gossip about metaphysicians, the
details of Hannah Arendt's affair with Martin Heidegger,4 for example, or of Bertrand Russell's physical gifts,5 provides a special
frisson, a ne plus ultra of satiated prurience. The desire to be in this
particular know, for me at any rate, is quite literally irresistible.
It is tempting, of course, to ascribe this to the general depravity
of the age of People magazine: why should Luftmenschen Iniss out
on the simple pleasures of the homme moyen sensuel? Enquiring
(master-) minds want to know too. Hence, the philosopher as celebrity. For "Wallis and Edward" or "Burt and Loni," just substitute "Jean-Paul and Simone" or "[famous logical positivist] and

* Associate Professor of Law, Boston College. A.B. 1975, Columbia; B.A. 1977, Oxford;
J.D. 1983, Yale; M.A. 1986, Oxford. - Ed. I would like to thank Hugh Ault, Sanford Katz,
Aviam Soifer, and Catharine Wells for reading an earlier draft of this essay.
1. LoN L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF llSELF 122-23 (1940).
2. OsCAR WILDE, The Picture Of Dorian Gray (1891), reprinted in PLAYS, PROSE WRITINGS AND POEMS 67, 78 (Everyman's Lib. 1972).
3. See Joseph Brodsky, Isaiah Berlin at Eighty, N.Y. REv. BooKS, Aug. 17, 1989, at 44, 45.
4. See generally EIZBIETA ErnNGER, HANNAH ARENDT/MARTIN HEIDEGGER (1995).
5. See A.L. ROWSE, GLIMPSES OF THE GREAT 13-14 (1985).
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[rough-trade boyfriend]." And, as we know full well in this democratic age, we often need our celebrities taken down a peg or two to
offset their fame. They're just people, you know, "no different from
anybody else," or so one imagines the leveler's gibe. Indeed, one
well-known philosophy don at Oxford who turned her hand to literature was accused, for her troubles, of writing not so much novels as
Harlequin romances for intellectuals. 6
In reality, this curiosity about the lives of philosophers is not an
entirely recent phenomenon. It dates back at least as far as Xenophon's and Diogenes Laertius' tale-telling biographies of Socrates,
not to mention the autobiographies of Augustine of Hippo and
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, or Montaigne's Meditations. Nonetheless,
what was known popularly about philosophers - as opposed to
their philosophies - tended to be limited to vignettes from their
lives served up as inspirational exempla: Aquinas resisting the prostitutes his brother sent to tempt him;7 Kant's nightly stroll through
Konigsberg, so punctual that housewives set their watches by it; the
assiduous Marx facing that daily pile of books in the British Museum. The aforementioned Diogenes Laertius, who wrote Lives of
Eminent Philosophers8 sometime in the third century A.O., had no
significant epigonoi. Apart from him, thus, we lack real philosophical analogues to Suetonius' Lives of the Twelve Caesars or Vasari's
Lives of Renaissance Artists, at least until relatively modem times.
Indeed, it is probably fair to say that the instinctive reaction of a
"premodem" educated sensibility to the inside scoop on Marx's
mistreatment of his children, for example, probably would have
been something along the lines of: "What's that got to do with his
ideas? Does it invalidate them? Does it shed any light on them? If
not, why should I care?" The unstated premise was that ideas particularly philosophical ideas - should stand or fall on their own.
Literature offers an instructive comparison here. The lives of
poets and novelists long have b.een a subject of enormous interest.
Such interest often rests on the not entirely implausible, but ultimately reductionist, notion, held by much of the public, that their
works are, in some direct way, really "about" their lives, and hence
that a more detailed knowledge of the latter necessarily will enhance or clarify their appreciation of the former. A strong reaction
against this sentiment emerged in the post-World War I era in the
form of the so-called New Criticism. The New Critics taught that
6. This barb was made in a review of a novel by Iris Murdoch, a prolific author of fiction
and philosophy. I now, however, no longer can locate the original source.
7. This story is apparently hagiographers' legend. See W.A. Wallace & J.A. Weisheipl, St.
Thomas Aquinas, in 14 NEW CA1HOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 102, 103 (William J. McDonald et al.
eds., 1967). The fictional nature of the story, however, only underscores my point.
8. DIOGENES LAERTIUS, LIVES OF EMINENT PmLOSOPHERS {R.D. Hicks, trans., Loeb
Classical Library 1925).
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the meaning of a work of art should be sought without reference to
biographical or historical data about how it arose. Many artists such as the poet W.H. Auden and the novelists Evelyn Waugh and
Gore Vidal - reinforced this message by pleading with readers to
confine their attentions to words and leave artists' lives alone, taking the position that knowledge of their lives was essentially irrelevant to their works. These protestations, however, reflected an
understandable desire for privacy as much as their artistic principle,
and Waugh and Vidal may have undercut their position b,y eventually publishing books of memoirs.9
The latest nouvelle vague to hit the shores of American legal
academe or, at any rate, the latest vague I've caught- deconstructionism - by rights ought to leave us uninterested in the low-level
folk who merely sling signs and thereby create texts. As we now
know, it is not they who give them meaning, but rather I, the
reader, happily at work in my interpretive community, humble
lecteur revealed at last as true auteur.

* * *
As may befit a discussion of American jurisprudence, let me
start out with a rather Langdellian move, and present some classifications - ideal-types, if you will - of jurisprudential writing. 10
These classifications are all fairly standard, nothing exotic. Furthermore, my listing hardly will be exhaustive; I wouldn't dream of it. I
only aim to identify some significant and recurring types.
1. The Primary Source: A work in which an author presents his own
ideas on one or more abstract questions about law - such as whether
it exists, what it is, where it comes from, and its relationship to justice
or morality. Such works might include John Rawls's A Theory of Jus.J.
tice11 or John Austin's The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. 12
They also might include works of shorter compass, such as Lon
Fuller's law review article Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to
Professor Hart, 13 to take a famous example. In any event, the jurisprudential ideas of a thinker, directly presented by him, are the hallmark of this type of writing. "Primary jurisprudence" might be
another name for it.
2. The Topical Collection of primary sources by various authors:
Thomas Grey's The Legal Enforcement of Morality, 14 for example, or

!

9. See GORE VIDAL, PALIMPSEST (1995); EVELYN WAUGH, A LITrLE LEARNING (1964).
10. Actual works of jurisprudence naturally may exhibit features of more than one type.
11. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
12. JoHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfrid E. Rawls
ed., 1995).
13. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630 (1958).
·
.
14. THOMAS C. GREY, THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY (1983).
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Feinberg & Grass's Justice: Selected Readings15 would fall under this
heading. Topical collections may present a wide range of opinion or a
narrow one, in which case they approximate my 'fype 1. The ideas
illustrated, however, and their worth in explaining legal phenomena,
again lie at the heart of such works.
3. The Critique: This is an intellectual response to ideas presented in
prinlary sources like the foregoing. Owen Fiss's The Death of the
Law?16 and Mari Matsuda's Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted
Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of
Justice belong here.17 A critique, naturally, also may serve as a vehicle for the presentation, or sharpening, of the critic's own ideas.
4. The Restatement: This category includes works, or portions of
works, in which the author attempts to restate, perhaps more plainly
or vividly, the jurisprudential ideas of another. Robert Gordon's
Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law1B might sit at
the high end of this category. In this work, Gordon's initial approach
to a jurisprudential question is one that, he frankly admits, derives
from others' work rather than his own,19 all en route to his own elegant synthesis. Study aids written for students in a jurisprudence
course, on the other hand, might fall at the low end of the category.
5. The Thematic Study: This category embraces works such as
Robert Summers's Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory, 20 the
topically organized, chronologically overlapping chapters of James
Herget's American Jurisprudence, 1870-1970, 21 and Karl Llewellyn's
Some Realism about Realism: A Reply to Dean Pound.22 The thematic study attempts to canvass and elucidate manifestations of a jurisprudential idea, or related ideas, in the works of several authors, or
perhaps even of one very prolific author. Writing a history of jurisprudence can be approached, indeed, as a large-scale thematic study,
or as a collection of thematic studies loosely organized around temporal sequence. This is a classic kind of "history of ideas." The thematic
study will, almost by necessity, share features of 'fypes 3 and 4, and
could present 'fype 1 material as well.

The primary source, topical collection, critique, restatement,
and thematic study are all unalloyed works of jurisprudence. Jurisprudential ideas as such are their direct and immediate concern.
15. JOEL FEINBERG & HYMAN GROSS, JUSTICE: SELECTED READINGS (1977).
16. Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1 {1986).
17. Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A
Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REv. 613 {1986).
18. Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 195 {1987).
19. See id. at 201 & n.5.
20. ROBERT SAMUELS SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTAUSM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY
(1982).
21. JAMES E. HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870-1970: A HISTORY {1990).
22. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Reaiism: A Reply to Dean Pound, 44 HARV.
L. REv. 1222 {1931).
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All belong to the heartland of jurisprudence. Naturally, however,
there are other sorts of jurisprudential writing besides these more specifically, works in which some other factor besides the
ideas themselves intervenes and looms large as one organizing
principle:
6. The Author Study: William 1\vining's Karl Llewellyn and the
Realist Movement23 and Robert Glennon's The Iconoclast as
Reformer: Jerome Frank's Impact on American Law24 clearly belong
here. This type of writing contains elements of restatement and critique, and possibly thematic study as well. Because a single individual
serves as its focus, the author study blends ideas with biography. It
will range from mundane details -where was he born? - to intellectual chronicle - when and how did he come up with this idea? One
reason we study a thinker's life is on the premise that his experiences
and activities may shed light on his thinking. On the other hand, picaresque or baroque details of the subject's life may make a good story
in their own right: the young Llewellyn winning the Iron Cross in
World War I; Frank's peculiar eyeglass frames making him a suspect
in the Leopold and Loeb murder case. Intellectual biography, it goes
without saying, is a well-recognized type of intellectual history.
7. The Group Study: This type of work simultaneously pursues a
thematic and biographical approach to the works and lives of a
number of thinkers. These will have been cohesive enough to form a
recognized school or to constitute an interconnected group, either in
received opinion or in a particular scholar's view.25
8. The Contextual Study: This attempts to put jurisprudential ideas
jn the presumptively illuminating context of something else. Such a
work might draw upon contemporaneous social developments or disciplines besides law to elucidate jurisprudential ideas. What historians or economists were thinking, for example, might shed light on the
jurisprudence of the same period. The contextual study is clearly a
very important subtype of intellectual history.

Types 6, 7 and 8 are still recognizably works of jurisprudence:
legal-philosophical ideas lie at the center, though they may share
that center with something else. There are, however, two last kinds
of jurisprudence-related work that I should mention just briefly:
9. The Biography: This differs from an author study in that the biographer minimizes or eliminates the subject's ideas in the interests of
presenting the presumably colorful life story of a person who also
happened to be, inter alia, a legal philosopher. Popular biographies
23. WILUAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (rev. ed. 1985).
24. ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK'S
IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW (1985).
25. Examples that come to mind from outside the law are F.O. Matthiessen's study of the
James family, THE JAMES FAMILY: A GROUP BIOGRAPHY (1947) and Humphrey Carpenter's
THE INKLINGS (1978), a study of the lives, works and careers of the Oxford-centered British
writers J.R.R. Tolkien, C.S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and so on.
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of Justice Holmes would fall into this category. In principle, there is
no reason why there should not be a group biography of academic
lawyers, other than the general dullness of their lives.
10. The "Other Hat Worn": This type of work explores the nonjurisprudential aspects of a legal philosopher's career, for instance, Soand-So as procedural reformer. The more the other hat worn is substantively related to the jurisprudence hat, the more this type approaches Type 6, the author study.

With the biography and "other hat worn," we finally have left
the ranks of jurisprudence altogether, so attenuated has any connection become. Nevertheless, someone with jurisprudential interests perhaps may learn from such a work relevant information he
then may turn to more traditionally jurisprudential ends.
What is the point of this apparently essentialist exercise? It is
not to suggest that there is, in principle, anything wrong with writing a work that is "not jurisprudence" or "not purely jurisprudence. "26 Rather, it lets me clarify a bias: a work that falls within
any of the first eight categories has an a priori claim on my attention as academic lawyer with an interest in jurisprudence. It also will
help to explain some methodological observations later in this
essay.
Now it may turn out that I will come to regard any particular
work of jurisprudence as wrongheaded, poorly executed, or otherwise uncongenial, in which case my attention will diminish or indeed entirely lapse. But ex ante it claimed my interest by type.
Works of the "non-jurisprudence" variety, on the other hand, start
out with no such presumption, at least when I am reading through a
jurisprudential lens. "Show me," I think, "the burden is on you."
As I read it, I may decide that my initial categorization of a work
was wrong and move it into a different, explicitly jurisprudential
slot. Maybe a work will appeal to me while I wear a different hat. I
may conclude that my categories were drawn too narrowly in the
first place and that I need to expand or loosen them up. All are
possible, but no matter. It goes to show my initial mindset and
expectations.

* * *
Neil Duxbury's Patterns of American Jurisprudence21 is a remarkable achievement. It is a thoughtful, detailed tour d'horizon of
American jurisprudence over the last century and a quarter, from
formalism to critical legal studies, with a glance or two beyond into
feminism and critical race theory. The scope of his coverage is awe26. And here, let me again intone my apotropaic chant: the above list is not meant to be
exhaustive.
27. Neil Duxbury is Reader in Law at the University of Manchester in England.

May 1996]

Jurisprudential Writing

1523

inspmng: Duxbury apparently has read every important work of
American jurisprudence, many not so important ones, plus a good
deal more besides. His copious footnotes alone, if nothing else,
guarantee that this work will become the academy's standard guide
to the last hundred years in American jurisprudence. Duxbury devotes six lengthy chapters to formalism, legal realism, policy science, process jurisprudence, law and economics, and critical legal
studies, respectively. They provide an essential starting point for
newcomers to these areas and offer more knowledgeable readers an
often provocative analysis, and - in the footnotes - a wealth of
details.
Duxbury's approach to his topic, however, is not so much jurisprudential as historiographic:
The primary objective of this book is not to explore generally the
problems that might arise from employing a handful of concepts and
themes to explain a comparably large variety of ideas about law, but
to try to demonstrate that our use of concepts and themes affects the
way in which we represent the history of legal ideas. [Duxbury,

pp. 1-2]
In Duxbtiry's view, a pendulum-swing model has warped our prior
understanding of the history of American jurisprudence:
[F]irst there was formalism, epitomized by the Langdellian revolution;
then came the realist revolt against formalism; after which came the
renaissance of formalism, exemplified by both process jurisprudence
and law and economics, which was superseded by the return to realism in the form of critical legal studies. The pendulum of history swings back and forth, accordingly, between formalism and realism.28

Elsewhere employing a pugilistic metaphor, he contends that "the
history of modern American jurisprudence does not resemble a
boxing contest ... it is not simply the trading of punches between
formalists and anti-formalists" (p. 471). He himself, by contrast,
speaks of a "jurisprudential drift" (p. 54) from formalism to realism.
The distortive pendular model, Duxbury believes, has led to a
simplistic, excessively schematic understanding of our postLangdellian jurisprudential history, in which "certain basic themes
- in particular, the themes of legal formalism and legal realism"
have been developed "in an over-emphatic, sometimes overdramatic, fashion" (p. 2). If we just calm down, it seems, we will
discover "complex patterns of ideas." We will see that
"[j]urisprudential ideas are rarely born; equally rarely do they
die.... Ideas - along with values, attitudes and beliefs - tend to
emerge and decline, and sometimes they are revived and refined.
But rarely do we see them born or die. History is not quite like
28. P. 2; see also pp. 308-09 (recapitulating the traditional account and describing it as
"the episodic conception of the past which seems to permeate American jurisprudential
discourse").
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that" (pp. 2-3). Duxbury labels his approach "jurisprudence as intellectual history."29
Many of us will recognize our own loose talk in Duxbury's description of the pendulum-swing approach, such as when we make
in-class, off-the-cuff, quick summations en passant. Whether it really has the serious impact on our self-understanding that he suggests is another matter. In so heavily footnoted a work, one would
expect to find so central a point corroborated by long string-cites
showing all manner of legal academics falling victim - in print and
thus presumably at their most cautiously reflective - to this misconception. For the most part I do not see the corroboration and
indeed suspect that Duxbury's point would be hard to substantiate
fairly, 30 particularly among our major writers in jurisprudence.
They are really not as obtuse as all that. The metaphor I would use,
instead of a pendulum swing, is drawn from art: there are quick
charcoal sketches and full-length oil portraits. Both have their appropriate occasions.
Part and parcel of the pendulum-swing notion is an allegedly
binomial, either-or pairing of "formalism" and "realismantiformalism." Writers on American jurisprudence, this appears
to suggest, have been wont to gloss over complications and to assign
jurisprudential thinkers and ideas to one or the other category. Let
us consider an example, however, that I think will illustrate a danger of writing "jurisprudence as intellectual history." At one point,
Duxbury attempts to provide a microlevel example of his overarching theory: "[S]ome commentators," he says, have charted "a
straight and uncluttered path from Holmes to the legal realists" that
produces "oversimplified intellectual history" by concentrating on
the antiformalist side of Holmes and ignoring the conflicting
proformalist strains of his work (p. 46). In support of this allegation
of "oversimplified intellectual history" are adduced four items of
evidence: Wilfrid E. Rumble, Jr.'s 1968 book American Legal
Realism: Skepticism, Reform and the Judicial Process;31 Bernie R.
Burrus's 1962 article American Legal Realism,32 Ralph J. Savarese's
1965 article of the same name;33 and William Twining's discussion
29. See pp. 1-7.
30. To do this fairly would require not just isolated quotations, but an assessment of overall context, and perhaps even of a large body of a writer's work.
31. WILFRID E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REAUSM 38-44 (1968). The introduction to the book indicates that Mr. Rumble was on the faculty at Vassar College.
32. Bernie R. Burrus, American Legal Realism, 8 How. LJ. 36, 37-38 (1962). Professor
Duxbury mistakenly gives the cite as 6 How. L.J. Mr. Burrus is identified there as shortly
about to begin as an Assistant Professor at Georgetown University Law School.
33. Ralph J. Savarese, American Legal Realism, 3 Hous. L. REv. 180, 186-87 (1965). The
text identifies Mr. Savarese as a member of the District of Columbia and New York bars.
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of Holmes in his 1973 study of Karl Llewellyn.34 As I read them,
however, two of th~se sources, Rumble and Twining, provide no
support at all for the thesis of a commentator-distorted Holmes.
The other two, Burrus and Savarese, provide, most charitably construed, only the flimsiest kind of support. One might, indeed, have
thought it infra dig to rely on them at all. I pick the actual nits in a
footnote. 35 My conclusion, however, is that Duxbury here does
34. TWINING, supra note 23, at 15-20.
35. Duxbury does not provide a definition of formalism, and I certainly shall not attempt
it in a footnote. For purposes of making a methodological point in a book review, I proceed
on the assumption that we have an intuitive sense of what formalism and antiformalism are.
Interested readers doubtless will wish to consult Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45
U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983).
Wilfrid Rumble indeed does provide a list of features of Holmes's thought that might be
described as antiformalist and that certain realists hence found attractive. Presumably, to
support Duxbury's thesis, one then needs to make the argumentum e silentio: since Rumble's
discussion does not mention the (pro-)formalist sides of Holmes's thought. it impliedly is
representing that it did not have any, and that this allegedly significant silence distorts the
"real" Holmes. Even granting - for the sake of discussion - that an argument from silence
can, in principle, have this kind of probative value, it would be outbome by Rumble's accompanying text, which is ringed with caveats: "The correspondence between these [Holmesian
antiformalist] ideas and those of the legal realists will become clear later in this study. The
immediate purpose is simply to indicate those points in Holmes's overall picture of the judicial process which profoundly infiuenced the views of the legal realists." Rumble, supra note
31, at 41 (emphasis supplied). "Any attempt to draw parallels between the views of Holmes
and those of the legal realists is, of course, dangerous. It is likely for one thing to deemphasize the tensions within Holmes's thinking.... [L]ike most great thinkers, his ideas are
not without their own inner stress." Id. at 43. "An exposition of points of similarity is likely,
also, to overemphasize the doctrinal unity within the realist movement." Id. at 44.
William 1\vining's discussion, which Duxbury claims "treats Holmes purely as an antiformalist" (p. 46 n.147), indeed does cite many of Holmes's well-known antiformalist
chestnuts: the attack on Langdell as legal theologian; the antithesis of logic and experience;
the bad man, indifferent to "axioms or deductions," trying to determine what courts will in
fact do. Any chance that we would come away with an image of Ollie-one-note, however, is
diminished and perhaps eliminated by accompanying discussion and citations of some formalist strands in Holmes's thought as well: "[Holmes] dismissed as unenlightened the practical minded who undervalued jurisprudence ('We have too little theory in the law rather than
too much')." TWINING, supra note 23, at 17 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, The Path
of the Law, in CoLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 198 (1920)). Noting that "Holmes was careful
to dissociate himself from the anti-intellectualism and narrow-mindedness of some men of
affairs," Twining goes on to quote another famous proformalist passage: " 'An intellect great
enough to win the prize needs other food besides success. The remoter and more general
aspects of law are those which give it universal interest.'" Id. at 18-19 (quoting HOLMES,
supra, at 202).
The discussions of Holmes by Burrus and Savarese are each a total of three paragraphs in
length, and the majority of the text in each case is devoted to quotation of the same three loci
clossici: the "logic and experience" passage from The Common Law, and the "bad man" and
"cynical acid" passages from The Path of the Law. With one exception in Savarese, Duxbury
basically has to rely on the probative value of the argumentum e silentio. In principle, such
value is, at best, very weak. Here, it approaches zero: anyone who expects a rounded picture
of a well-known Great Mind in three paragraphs deserves to be misled. Furthermore, I argue
in the main text that a reader of a pure jurisprudence text - as opposed to texts of other
kinds - has no legitimate expectation of receiving a complete portrait of the authors on
which the text relies. See infra text accompanying notes 36-37.
At one point in his discussion, Savarese does veer somewhat off the edge with a reference
to Holmes's "entirely empirical and skeptical definition of law in his celebrated essay The
Path of the Law." Savarese, supra note 33, at 187. I would have amended the adverb to

1526

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 94:1517

precisely what he accuses others of doing: writing oversimplified
intellectual history. Hence, when he puts on the trunks to get in the
ring with the pendulum-swing-binomial-pairing model of American
jurisprudential history, one winds up somehow feeling that Professor Duxbury has just K.0.-ed his own straw man.
How does Duxbury's overconstrual of a number of secondary
sources about Holmes illustrate a generic danger of writing "jurisprudence as intellectual history"? To try to explain my point, let
me first propose a number of imaginary jurisprudential statements,
such as might be made in the different types of jurisprudential
writing:
1. "Experience and intuition are what judges use when they decide
cases." (Primary Source)
2. "It is not experience and intuition, but logic, that dictates the outcome of cases." (Critique)
3. "When we consider the various ways jurisprudential thinkers have
sought to explain the judicial process, we can recognize two divergent
strands: an experiential-intuitionalist approach and a logico-rationalist approach, with the latter generally predominating in standard academic discussions of the matter." (Thematic Study)
4. "While Jones's antiformalist hons mots are the more frequently
quoted, they in fact are equaled in number by expressions of his
proformalist sentiments." (Author Study - Intellectual Biography)
5. a. "Jones's well-known antiformalism can be understood better if
we look at what his Pragmatist friends were writing at about the
same time." (Contextual Study - Intellectual History)
b. "Smith misinterprets Jones by referring to him as an antiformalist pure and simple." (History of Ideas - Intellectual
History).
6. "The workings of the judicial process can be explained best as a
mixture of logic and experience. Overemphasizing either one distorts
the reality." (Primary Jurisprudence)

When one chooses, as Duxbury has done, to write about jurisprudence historically, there is, right at the outset, a hybrid mixture
of perspectives and approaches. The core of jurisprudence is abstract ideas about law, while history ultimately relates to persons.
With the benefit of a hundred years of discussion behind us, one
may, for example, conceivably feel the stirrings of a "purely" jurisprudential statement like number 6, but because one is also writing
history, one feels compelled to illustrate it - or at least the second
half of it - with a statement like number 5(b). Conversely, there
"largely" myself. But this hyperbole is mitigated by the implications of Savarese's earlier
statement that "early recognition by Holmes of the significant role of nonlogical factors in
the judicial process can be found in [the logic-and-experience passage]." Id. at 186-87. To
belabor the obvious, "a significant role of non-logical factors" necessarily suggests some role
for logical ones.
In any event, I am not aware that either the Burrus or the Savarese paragraphs have been
crucial to the way we understand Holmes.
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may be an obvious sequential progression, through a number of
logical stages, from one jurisprudential concept to another. Yet because one also is writing history, because there is a story to be told,
one feels a need to illustrate the stages of that progression with concrete individuals whose writing "exemplifies" them. Indeed, one
whose view of prior historiography is premised on a dialectic model
will go out looking for stages and doubtless will find them. The
simultaneous imperatives of the jurisprudence-history hybrid, however, may make it hard to do either one full justice. For example,
an Italian legal philosopher writing in another context may have an
obvious riposte to a jurisprudential position taken by an American
thinker, but such a response lies outside of American jurisprudential history. Alternatively, people may be used distortingly as proxies for ideas they occasionally expressed, or their words may be
overconstrued so as to fill in a slot in the dialectic schema. Ideas
are dramatized, and sometimes overdramatized, with instantiating
"representatives," when, to do real justice to the actual people involved, an author study is what is really called for. Thus, as with his
discussion of commentators on Holmes (p. 46), I did from time to
time feel that Duxbury was providing somewhat tendentious readings of his sources. This did not occur often enough, however, to
shake my basic faith in him as fair-minded guide. Admittedly, it is
not always easy to distinguish "tendentious" from "different from
my interpretation."
There is a further methodological point to be made about the
difference between jurisprudence and intellectual history. When
discussing Holmes as the realists' precursor and criticizing those
later commentators who draw a straight line from themselves back
to the great jurist, Duxbury reproaches the realists: "Various realists gleaned from Holmes all that corresponded with their particular
versions of antiformalism, and left behind them all that did not"
(p. 46). To which, however, the appropriate response can be only:
"If so,36 so what?" To the extent that the realists pursued a Type-1
jurisprudential program - by which I mean they explored or advanced their abstract ideas about law - they had no obligation to
present a rounded portrait of Holmes. To a jurisprudent acting
solely as such, Holmes legitimately might be regarded as a source of
36. In support of his thesis of realists themselves distorting Holmes, Duxbury cites two
sources: Morris R. Cohen, Justice Holmes and the Nature of Law, 31 CoLUM. L. REv. 352,
356, 363 {1931) and Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787,
818 (1989). In each case, there is exactly one specific instance mentioned, and it is the same
one in both: JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). I would be delighted to
hear an explanation of why constantly citing the most extreme representative of a particular
movement - or "mood," as Duxbury would have it - as though he were equal to legal
realism as a whole is not an example of "overdramatic, oversimplified" jurisprudential
history.
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ideas, a quarry of pithy phrasings of antiformalist insights.37 Such
thinkers may have found Holmes's formalist side unpersuasive or
contrary to what American jurisprudence then needed to hear.
Perhaps they were campaigning for a temporary divorce of logic
and experience, or perhaps a permanent one. In any case, I see no
problem with selective quotation. Critics of realism, in turn, were
equally free to cite only Holmes's more formalist observations. In a
Type-5 author study, by contrast, which simultaneously must restate
its subject's overall jurisprudence and present his intellectual history, such selectivity would be a glaring defect. I judge it inappropriate for Duxbury to hold the realists to the standards of another
subfield - the author study - when they were undertaking primary jurisprudence. It is inappropriate - a category mistake - to
treat jurisprudence like intellectual history. This is not to say that
intellectual history should not be written about jurisprudence. But
it pays to keep different types of ideas separate.
Earlier on, I stated a bias in favor of a certain brand of jurisprudential writing, and my final critical observation must be viewed
against that background. I would have liked for Professor Duxbury
to talk more "across" the chapters, stepping back from the stories in
each to give us his own views about which, if any, of the arguments
approached a "right" answer. 38 A distinctive auctorial point of
view would have made it more the sort of jurisprudence text I prefer. While I regret its absence, I also recognize that it would have
made an already very long book even longer.

* * *
But enough carping about methodology. When all is said and
done, Duxbury's work tells a richly detailed story - interspersed
with the odd lapidary phrasing - of the intellectual enterprise
called "American jurisprudence since Langdell." Its overall quality
stands, despite my disagreements with various of his judgments. To
my mind, his work reaches its best level not when summarizing,
paraphrasing, and marshaling books of jurisprudence and law review articles, but rather when it puts a particular school, movement,
or "mood" in that jurisprudence into a nonlegal context. Especially
good, in my view, are the discussions of legal realism's background
in artistic and social-scientific realism and in institutional economics; the Chicago school's rootedness in the economic thought of the
rest of the University of Chicago; and the connections between the
37. Moreover, commentators on realism legitimately might emphasize those features of
Holmes's thought that influenced the realists.
38. Duxbury is, however, quite good about putting his finger on the intellectual weaknesses of the jurisprudential patterns he discusses, and so to that extent he does take substantive positions, albeit only negative ones. See, for example, his assessment of John Hart Ely's
version of "process" jurisprudence. See pp. 292-93.
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nascent critical legal studies and the "New Left." Along the same
lines, I regret that we did not hear more about pragmatism in the
chapter on legal realism.39
Formalism: Duxbury,s introductory chapter on legal formalism
seeks to demonstrate that there are two strands of legal formalism,
only one of which involves deductive legal reasoning, which he calls
"academic formalism.,, He notes that the Socratic method, the
anointed vehicle for the inculcation of legal formalism, actually
arose at Columbia, not Harvard, and that Langdell was only its first
Harvard practitioner. Langdell's pupil, James Barr Am.es, was its
true apostle, changing its whole orientation from teaching doctrine
to teaching legal reasoning. Duxbury makes the interesting observation that the philosophy underlying the case method - which
Langdell apparently saw as analogous to contemporaneous innovations in the teaching of chemistry - was itself illberently Darwinist:
survival of the fittest cases.
The more "famous,, realists like Karl Llewellyn and Jerome
Frank tended to train their fire primarily on academic formalism.
Duxbury, however, believes that one also should understand formalism to include a different, forensic formalism: the laissez-faire,
social Darwinist approach of late-nineteenth- and early-twentiethcentury courts to, for example, labor contracts, an approach that
deemed all parties legally equal, whatever their real economic
power. Duxbury is not the first to undertake this renewed emphasis: Joseph Singer was making a similar argument in 1988,40 and
doubtless there were others.
Duxbury finds it inapt to speak of a "revolt against formalism" 41
in law in the sense of a sudden break with tradition by the realists.
He tries to show, as I mentioned above, a "jurisprudential drift"
from formalism to realism, describing the movement from one to
the other as "very slow and hesitant" (p. 3). To do this, he looks at
the thought of four "in-between" figures - Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, John Chipman Grey, and
Roscoe Pound - each of whom had a foot in both camps. I doubt
that anyone today will take exception with Duxbury,s claims about
the four. Readers who think a "revolt" necessarily involves unprecedented suddenness will agree with Duxbury's conclusion that the
realists of the late twenties and early thirties did not revolt. Others
may think it legitimate to use that word to refer to a period when
antiformalist elements in the thinking of certain high-visibility legal
academics and others had come to predominate, such that it was no
39. Duxbury's discussion of pragmatism is a little over a page long. See pp. 127-29.
40. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 465, 475-95 (1988)
(reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)).
41. See p. 3. The phrase is Morton White's.
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longer possible to speak of a balance of opposing tendencies. As
Engels said somewhere, changes of quantity eventually end up becoming changes of quality.
Realism: In any case, Duxbury judges realism to have been just
a mood rather than a movement, pace Karl Llewellyn42, and certainly not a school. Having just quibbled over the word "revolt," I
do not want to go through the same process all over again. I just
would note that one possibly alarmist view of Duxbury's general
strategy is to see him as minimizing realism's substantive significance ("no big deal") while conceding its power to generate sound
and fury ("much ado about nothing"), only later to pronounce it a
failure. 43 Readers who wonder how a mood can be a failure should
not look to me for an explanation.
In discussing the famous Llewellyn-Pound debate of the early
1930s, Duxbury reaches the conclusion that "there are no good historical or conceptual reasons for demarcating the prerealists from
the realists, and that realism accordingly should be regarded as the
continuation of a particular trend - namely, the growing dissatisfaction with legal formalism - rather than as the beginning of
something substantively new" (p. 77). This is rather like saying that
because Homo sapiens is not all that genetically different from
chimps, Homo sapiens is nothing new. It is all a matter of with
whom you are comparing him, I suppose. On that logic, because
there are no obvious lines of demarcation, we could make the same
statement about orangutans, sloths, and for that matter protoplasms. Man, after all, is nothing new: he is still just organic
matter.
It is true that Llewellyn was not far removed from "protorealists" like Holmes, whom he pronounced our greatest jurist,44 or
Cardozo, to whom he dedicated his early study of American case
law.45 But was he not, to leave Jerome Frank quite out of the picture, already much further away than either of them from formalism? Think, for example, of Llewellyn's exposition of what he
called the "Janus-faced case method,"46 an early example of the
radical indeterminacy thesis. At what point is it legitimate to recognize a change in quantity as a change in quality? On Duxbury's
ontology, apparently never. Yet the change in quality is, I believe,
precisely the difference between divergent strains in establishment
42. See Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 1233-34.
43. See, e.g., pp. 158-59, 298.
44. See KARL LLEWELLYN, RECHT, RECHTSLEBEN UND GESELLSCHAFT 30 (1977) (1932).
45. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA xxxi (Paul Gewirtz ed.
& Michael Ansaldi trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1989) (1933).
46. See id. at 46-50; K.N. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BusH 74-76, 179 (Oceana Publications
1951) (1930).
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thought and the thinking of anti-establishment mavericks. People.
paid more attention, and the implications of their thought penetrated the consciousness of more and more people.
I also think that it is just plain wrong to argue, as Duxbury does
(pp. 130-31), that because realists had aspirations of predicting case
outcomes, they were covert formalists. I see no necessary connection between a belief that case outcomes can be predicted, albeit
with less than one hundred percent certainty, and formalism.
Llewellyn, for one, thought that a fair amount of certainty was attainable, but only such certainty as would result not from the application of some formula but from the exercise of judgment by a
trained lawyer focusing his attention not simply on legal logic but
on social, sociological, and institutional factors as well. His was certainty over the run of cases, rather than certainty as regards any
particular case: macro- but not microcertainty.47 Hence, I find
Duxbury's contention here unpersuasive.
I earlier complimented Duxbury for his detailed "situating" of
legal realism in the context of realism in art and social sciences,48
and for profiling the background of the more economic side of realism in institutional economics. His story also goes over some familiar terrain: the social-science leanings of certain Yale and Columbia
faculty, the creation of the Johns Hopkins Institute for the Study of
Law, and legal realist ideas for reforming legal education. He
broaches less familiar territory with a discussion of realism on the
Constitution, wherein he discerns the influence of Charles Beard,
and with his brief but illuminating account of "Realism and the regulatory state." Here, Duxbury suggests that realist jurisprudence
and the New Deal coincided only in a shared belief that law was or
could be "a tool for shaping social policy" (p. 155). Also interesting
is his treatment of Jerome Frank. He demonstrates that Frank's
invocation of psychology in Law and the Modern Mind49 was not as
novel as I previously had thought. Duxbury leads off his section on
Frank in quite an original way - with a discussion emphasizing
Frank's use of concepts of symbolism and word magic.
Was realism ultimately just a failed mood? I am not sure that
the success-failure matrix is the best one for assessing jurisprudence. We're not talking about Willy Loman here. But accepting
the success-failure dichotomy for the moment - if you highlight
realism's advocacy of an indissoluble marriage of law and social sci47. Quite apart from THE COMMON LAw TRADmON (1960), written towards the end
of his life, Llewellyn already was making such arguments in the early 1930s. See, e.g.,
LLEWELLYN, supra note 45, at 11-12, 76-82; see also Michael Ansaldi, The German Llewellyn,
58 BROOK. L. REv. 705, 775-77 (1992).
48. Here, I also would add the contemporaneous verismo movement in Italian opera as
evidence of a transnational ''mood."
49. FRANK, supra note 36.
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ence to follow the temporary divorce of Is and Ought, as Duxbury
does,s 0 I too probably would have to find it a failure. Duxbury,
however, goes on to state that the realists failed to construct "a convincing alternative" to "the Langdellian pedagogic framework"
(p. 158). I am not quite sure what this means. If it means that realists still used the case method in their teaching, my response would
be that they apparently found it a good tool for their purposes, and
thus felt no need to come up with an alternative. In any case, as
Joseph Singer has noted, realism fundamentally has altered the way
we talk about cases.s1 Furthermore, the "cases and materials"
teaching text the realists pioneered52 has become the standard, replacing the old-style Langdellian compilation of cases tout court.
Also, while legal education has not become as clinical in approach
as Jerome Frank might have wanted, it has moved much further in
that direction, with increased simulated and external learning opportunities for law students. Law schools now pay much more attention to skills other than appellate advocacy, a development of
which Llewellyn doubtless would have approved, even while perhaps finding it insufficient.
What Duxbury may mean by a failure to come up with a pedagogic alternative to Langdellianism, however, is that realists had
nothing to put in the place of specious deductive certainty: the
"normative vacuum" at the heart of realism. If so, then he and I
just view the same thing differently. What he sees as a failure, I
regard as a success. Furthermore, I am not at all sure that they had
nothing to put in its place; what they had to offer just may have
been more modest and "realistic."
Policy Science: Surely it is some indication of realism's potency,
if not "success," that some significant part of the jurisprudence that
followed felt obliged to respond to it, particularly to that "normative vacuum." In other words, realism got people thinking hard.
Duxbury treats the "policy-science" jurisprudence of Harold
Lasswell and Myres McDougal as a "failed neo-realist initiative,"
but one that now consciously poured democratic political values
into that normative hole (p. 164). It failed because those values
proved to be as manipulable as the vacuum itself. Once again,
there was no there there. Logic had failed, and so too would Western political values.
Duxbury's chapter provides a very clear account of this rather
puzzling movement. He shows how policy science took one of the
50. See p. 158. He is not alone in this assessment: see, for example, Elizabeth Warren,
Comments on Professor White's Paper, ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 49-55 (1988).
51. See Singer, supra note 40, at 473-75; see also JoHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CML
LAw TRAomoN 66-67 (2d ed. 1985).
52. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT y ALE: 1927-1960, at 78-97 (1986).
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weaker strains in realism - its largely long-distance love affair with
the social sciences - and pursued it to an incomprehensible extreme, to a belief that "the social sdences may be an invaluable
source of normative guidance" (p.172), to a "utopian vision ... of a
new world order in which social policy is generated, primarily, by
social science" (p. 175). It may be one thing to say that society
needs to stipulate to some values so as to be able to get along; it is
quite another to try to wish away the contingent character of the
stipulation by sending "science" out there to "find" the values for
you. People were obviously desperate for a there to be there.
Duxbury notes that Lasswell's background was as a propagandist (p. 166), and it seems obvious, from a cynical post-Vietnam
vantage point, that policy science was largely about the preaching
of American values. These basic values -individualism, power, respect, enlightenment, skill, wealth, well-being, rectitude and affections3 - were a discovered datum, and their worth "a matter
beyond political or moral debate - they exist, as it were, 'beyond
ethics'" (p. 178). It certainly strikes one as echt Amerikanisch to go
around holding truths self-evident, while ignoring real-world complications. Individualism is obviously a swell thing, but how far
does it go? When the father of two young children decides he
needs to "find himself" and skips for the coast, ·that is a highly individualistic thing to have done, even though it probably conflicts
with the wealth and well-being of the wife and kids.s4 Do we applaud Dad for his individualism? Reply hazy; ask again later.
Policy science also wanted to change legal education to mold
"lawyers of the future" and strove to create a curriculum "suitable
for training lawyers to put democratic values into policy" (p. 180).
Its efforts constituted, Duxbury notes, the first attempt to conceive
of lawyering as "an overtly political endeavour" (p. 164). It never
really caught on, at least in part because it seemed too elitist and
impractical. It does rather smack of a three-year civics course.ss
Process Jurisprudence: Or then again, maybe the there did not
matter as much as how you got wherever it was you were going.
Duxbury's title for the chapter on legal process jurisprudence,
"Finding Faith in Reason," nicely evokes his theme. Formalism had
"logic" and "rules"; now came "reason" and "principle." What's
the difference between "rule" and "principle"? Principle has three
syllables? And then too, reason is a fair bit squishier than "logic."
53. The list changed a fair bit, and the above is my working out of what Duxbury suggests
was a later final form. See pp. 178, 183.
54. This example is suggested by the work of Andrew Hacker.
55. While policy science, Duxbury notes, was generally a failure in the sense that its values ultimately were recognized as nonobjective and its program for reform of legal education
was not accepted, it survives as an important school in international law. See pp. 196-99.
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Emphasizing his antipendular point, Duxbury cautions us
against the standard story in which process jurisprudence makes its
debut in the post-World War II era as yet another response to realism. He contends instead that process jurisprudence "parallels if
not precedes legal realism itself" (p. 205). On the other hand,
"[c]ertainly process jurisprudence began to :flourish once the mood
of realism began to wane" (p. 205). What then is process jurisprudence? It, too, is not a school (p. 206), but this time an "attitude"
toward law (p. 207)- and one "remarkably difficult to pin down,"
"tend[ing] to bobble to the surface of, rather than to dominate, the
works of those who shared it" (p. 207). Its stirrings can be traced in
Langdellianism and legal realism itself, and still more palpably in
jurists of the mettle of Robert Maynard Hutchins, John Chipman
Gray, Roscoe Pound, and Benjamin Cardozo. Duxbury also identifies its presence in the works of a distinguished and highly diverse
assortment of later scholars, including Lon Fuller, Henry Hart, Albert Sacks, Alexander Bickel, Harry Wellington, John Rawls, Herbert Wechsler, and John Hart Ely. Indeed, he finds it "embedded
in modem American jurisprudential discourse" (p. 208).
What was distinctive about process jurisprudence, these "lawyers with an attitude"? In retrospect, they seemed to have two
quite sensible if not particularly remarkable insights, plus a metaphysical belief. Process jurisprudence quite appropriately focused
attention, first, on questions of institutional competence: "which institution within the legal process might be considered best equipped
to deal with which problems?" (p. 233). Or, in another version,
"the issue of what courts are good for - and not good for ... [and]
the whole range of questions as to the appropriate relationship between the federal courts and other organs of federal and state government."56 It should, however, be pointed out that Llewellyn, a
realist, already was thinking along similar lines in the late 1920s.57
Its second insight was simply that statutes should be interpreted
with an eye to their purpose (pp. 228-30). Today that sounds almost
fatuous, but obviously once it did not.
These aperfus, which seem more in the nature of midlevel political theory than jurisprudence, have little if anything to say about
non-statutory adjudication. They were accompanied, however, by a
56. P. 236 (quoting HENRY M. HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
FEDERAL SYSTEM xii (1953)); see also pp. 255-62 (reviewing Hart and Sacks on
institutional competence).
57. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 45, at 66-68; cf. id. at 101-04. (This work was published
in 1933, but the relevant portions had been completed by the beginning of 1930.) See id. at
xxxvii. Lon Fuller, who was one of Duxbury's process jurisprudents to focus attention on
institutional competence, see infra text accompanying note 61, had read this work of Llewellyn's. See Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429 (1934); L.L. Fuller,
Book Review, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 551 (1934).
AND THE
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related faith in reason and a belief in consensus, which turn out to
be not especially helpful for common-law judging, despite initial appearances. In an attempt to differentiate appropriate roles for
courts and for legislatures, process jurisprudence ventured that
while legislatures may set policy, courts must decide by principles,
which they can locate through reason. What made something a
principle rather than a policy? Why, the fact that courts could use it
but not the other.
When they stepped off the semantic merry-go-round, process
lawyers generally failed to make things any clearer. They were
chasing a distinction without much if any substantive difference.
Over and over and over again, principle and policy collapsed into
the reality of judicial and legislative choice. You say to-may-to, I
say to-mah-to; the fact that one plant grows in my garden and the
other in yours does not make either of them any less a Lycopersicon
esculentum.
If reason, ultimately, is just shorthand for the idea that judges
and other decisionmakers should reflect before they act, amen to
that. Yet, somehow I find apodictic assurances that reason - or
reasoned elaboration,ss or whatever you call it - will lead to
unarguably right answers consistently underwhelming. I have never
really gone in much for the oracular style of argumentation. Lowering a deus ex machina onto the set remains as plausible as it ever
was. Sometimes, alas, it seems as if Walter Wheeler Cook, Jerome
Frank, and Karl Llewellyn might never have written a word.
Of the whole process movement, Alexander Bickel's philosophy
of judicial prudence, which postulated that judges should sometimes stifle themselves by making the essentially political judgment
not to follow a principle out to its nth implication, came closest to
practical wisdom - not to mention the reality of what goes on. A
principle that does not have to be followed all the time sounds suspiciously like one policy colliding with a competing policy. Such a
situation obviously calls for judgment, not reason.
Law and Economics:59 Although there certainly were American lawyers interested in law and economics before the rise of the
Chicago school, in Duxbury's opinion there was nothing cohesive
enough to be called a law and economics movement. Those who
58. Seep. 259 (discussing Hart and Sacks on reasoned elaboration).
59. Indulging a version of his antipendular bent yet again, Professor Duxbury begins his
chapter on the law and economics movement with a perhaps less than entirely riveting disquisition on whether that movement is or is not related to legal realism, critical legal studies,
and process jurisprudence, and if so in what way and how much. It is not that the topic is out
of place in such a work, but that it is out of place at the beginning of a chapter. Such a
relatively detailed discussion would be better placed in an appendix: how can readers possibly assess the merits of his genealogical analysis before being told about either law and economics itself or critical legal studies, the subject of the following chapter?
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did discuss law and economics during that time tended to distrust
courts as makers of economic policy due to judicial adherence to
laissez-faire principles; they looked instead to legislatures to fulfill
that role. They also tended to regard market failures as a common
phenomenon, fully correctable through governmental regulation.
Most of modern law and economics springs from very different
sources. As I have noted already, Duxbury provides a quite interesting account of the competing personalities - including Milton
Friedman - and theories in the University of Chicago's economics
department, before and after its institutional embrace of neoclassicism. Disagreement in that department, in fact, led to the appointment in 1939 of a junior professor from its ranks to become the law
school's first economist (p. 335).
Once again, Duxbury guides us away from an overly simplified
history. There was no neat division between the "old" Chicago
school of the 1940s and 1950s, which supposedly applied economic
theory only to the more obviously economic areas of law like antitrust, tax, corporate law, and public utilities, and the "new" Chicago
school of the 1960s and after, which purportedly then sought to extend such analysis into "non-market areas of legal activity" as well
(pp. 380-81). While the simplification is not entirely devoid of
truth, we learn in fact that during the mid-1940s "the seeds of the
'new' law and economics [already] were being planted" (p. 341).
Be that as it may, in that earlier period antitrust law unquestionably served as a key focus of the Chicago school. Under the guidance of Aaron Director, an economist who came to be what
Duxbury calls a general eminence grise of the Law School, the Chicago school took the position that "the prevalence of private monopoly" was "exaggerated" (p. 338). It contended that since "it is
virtually impossible to eliminate competition from economic life ...
monopolies are essentially unstable [because] new competitors will
emerge" (p. 345). Accordingly, it concluded that "regulation is the
proper function of markets rather than governments" (p. 343). This
view of antitrust law generated a great deal of criticism, much of it
coming from Harvard. Nevertheless, by the 1970s, "Chicagoinspired economic analysis was beginning clearly to dominate debate about antitrust policy in the United States" (p. 355), and this
domination has continued, in part, because of the appointment of
Chicago-style law and economics jurists to the federal bench during
the Reagan and Bush presidencies.
As mentioned, this style of economic analysis eventually would
be applied extensively to other areas of law, such as property law,
that at first blush did not seem amenable to economic treatment. A
key stage in this development was Ronald Coase's pioneering work
on transaction costs, as well as his enunciation of the "Coase theo-
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rem," which held that in the absence of transaction costs "the legal
assignment of property rights to parties involved in negotiation
would have no effect on the eventual allocation of resources between them" (p. 387). As with its antitrust theories, the newer
"nonmarket" applications of Chicago law and economics did not go
unchallenged. This time the most pointed criticism emanated from
Yale. Guido Calabresi thus summarized law and economics'
limitations:
"[E]conomic theory ... cannot tell us how far we want to go to save
lives and reduce accident costs. Economic theory can suggest one approach - the market - for making the decision. But decisions balancing lives against mon~y or convenience cannot be purely monetary
ones, so the market method is never the only one used." ... [C]ertain
activities may be sustainable in market terms, [but] they may be prohibited for the simple reason that "there are some things we do not
want in our society regardless of costs."60
Duxbury concludes his chapter with an account of the career of the

most vigorous academic advocate of an expansivist application of
economic analysis to law: the "demonized" Richard Posner and his
efficiency and wealth-maximization principles.
Critical Legal ~tudies: Duxbury finds the pendulum theory to
have some validity here, though not in the way one might at first
imagine: CLS is not a revival of realism, but it is a reaction by some
segments of American law against the appeals to consensus and individualism implicit both in process jurisprudence and law and economics. Furthermore, unlike the "amorphous" mood that was
realism, CLS qualifies as a real "movement" because it has been
"more co-ordinated, institutionalized and clearly self-identified" (p.
425).

.

Duxbury begins his discussion with "the political backdrop," i.e.,
the New Left, university-based beginnings of the movement, as' well
as the "law and development" programs at Harvard, Yale, Stanford,
and Wisconsin, which attempted " 'to formulate valid generalizations about the relationships between law and the major economic,
social, and political transformations associated with industrialization.' "61 These programs provided the training ground for the "law
and society movement," which Duxbury depicts as a partial precursor to CLS. But some who had originally been more sympathetic to
the law and society movement ultimately grew critical of its apolitical style of analysis and its failure to recognize law's ideological
side.
60. P. 393 (quoting Guroo CALABRESI, THE CoST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
18, 100 (1970)).
61. P. 437 (quoting David Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the
Study of Law and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 21 (1972)).
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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CLS was "invented" in the late 1970s as a perception began to
form that there was a "growing leftist presence in the law schools"
(p. 447). A committee organized to plan a conference and draw up
a list of who was to be invited. The first Conference on Critical
Legal Studies, held in May of 1977 at the University of Wisconsin,
produced both good scholarship and a fair amount of backbiting.
Duxbury surveys the works of a number of the best-known
"Crits," including Morton Horwitz, Roberto Unger, and Duncan
Kennedy. He observes that Horwitz's scholarship "endeavours to
demonstrate that American judges, from the late eighteenth century onwards, began to mould common law doctrine so that it
favoured mercantile, as opposed to other group interests within society" (p. 451). Unger's work, by contrast, he views as visionary,
aimed at total critique and social transformation. He notes, however, that "the nature of the post-liberal, solidaristic society is
something about which Unger is only able to speculate" (p. 455).
Finally, Duxbury summarizes Kennedy's intellectual project
throughout the 1970s, the so-called indeterminacy thesis, as an
"elaborat[ion of] ... the tensions inherent in liberal legal thought
and doctrine" (p. 457).
In its heyday, the 1980s, CLS grew, in Robert Gordon's words,
"so exotically varied and internally divided as to defy characterization almost entirely."62 Although older themes continued to be developed, new ones came to the fore, including "the inadequacy of
rights discourse and the viability of nihilism as a basis for a legal
theory" (p. 470). Duxbury also notes the emergence of "trashing"
and the publication of the first edition of the CLS reader The
Politics of Law. 63 Roberto Unger, meanwhile, continued to write
about the society of the future, to which Duxbury responds with no
little exasperation and a rather tart in-joke:
Assuming that the types of institutional revision deemed necessary
for the transition from liberalism to post-liberalism could ever be effectuated, why should we wish to commit ourselves to such an upheaval? Yet again, Unger confesses and avoids. The first three
volumes of Politics "merely suggest the outline of a vision that needs
to be worked out later." So many books, pages and words, and Unger
is still promising to deliver the goods next time. God, it seems, has
not yet spoken.64

Here, Duxbury reveals his basic good sense: considering that law
professors are generally the sort of people with whom one prefers
to avoid even having lunch, one certainly does not want to live in a
62. P. 467 (quoting Robert W. Gordon, Law and Ideology, 3 TIKKUN 14, 15 (1988)).
63. THE Pouncs OF LAw (David Kairys ed., 1982).
64. P. 481 (quoting ROBERTO M. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY 560 (1987)).
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society designed by them. One faculty meeting will convince anyone of that.
As with Judge Posner, Duxbury tells of the demonization of
CLS, recounting the faculty tensions at Harvard - once described
by David Trubek as "the Beirut of legal education" - and the
brouhaha generated by a suggestion that adherents of CLS did not
belong in legal academe. Duxbury draws a nice parallel between
the Crits' reactions to the latter and the earlier relationship between the New Left and the universities: Academe was an evil club
in which the dissidents nonetheless wanted full membership .
. It may be time to switch to the past tense when discussing CLS,
Duxbury implies, because it "peaked in the American law schools
in the middle of the 1980s and has been losing momentum ever
since" (p. 426). If CLS is moribund, why? There are any number of
reasons, of which Duxbury highlights three: the appeal of
neopragmatism, generational conflicts within the movement, and
the fissuring off of feminism and critical race theory. Here, in any
event, I revert to my earlier question: does the success-failure
model, to which the "death" idea is obviously related, provide the
correct framework for judging jurisprudence? Even if the CLS
movement dies, - in the sense, for example, that people who call
themselves Crits cease to foregather as such - we still must ask
whether, and how much, such a way of thinking has enriched or
sharpened our knowledge of the law, our own personal jurisprudence. That, I think, is the question we need to ask about all the
schools, or movements, or moods that Duxbury has so thoroughly
and ably chronicled.

* * *
What and whomever else he may have meant, we know for certain that Emil Cioran cannot have been referring to American jurisprudence or its creators when he alluded to the fascinations of
gossip and metaphysics. On the metaphysical side, the most enduring achievements of American jurisprudence have, to my mind,
largely been negative. Of a profession that so vaunts its allegedly
Socratic methods, it is particularly fitting to say that, metaphysically, we are stalled in the aporia of the early Platonic dialogues.
And gossip? Odium philologicum, the renowned pettiness of bookmen, schemes and squabbles over matters of little import - these
would be mostly our topic here, supplemented no doubt by the odd
drunk or seducer. Fairly tame stuff; entertaining enough in the
hands of a C.P. Snow, David Lodge, or F.M. Cornford.
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Neil Duxbury seeks to write jurisprudence as intellectual history. John Henry Schlegel,65 author of American Legal Realism
and Empirical Social Science, writes in a rather different key:
I believe that intellectual history, as traditionally understood as a history of ideas embodied in texts, is an essentially empty exercise,
though intelligible as the practice of a group of historians who participate in a professional identity that sees history as a largely autonomous enterprise of academics responding to other academics. Rather
than a history of ideas, intellectual history needs to be the history of
intellectuals, people who do things with ideas - in this case in an
academic setting. [Schlegel, pp. 4-5]

In an afterword to his book, he writes, in a still more radical vein:
It is time we consider giving up the history of ideas, giving up intellectual history as a history of the ideas of humans set apart from the rest
of their lived experience, and to begin to write the history of intellectuals .... Let us simply stop the pretense that it is the dance of reason
that we chronicle in intellectual history, if only in the name of more
accurately representing the thinkers of the past as that humanistic
ideal - people trying their best to get from Monday to Tuesday in as
honorable a job as they have managed to find. Let us stop looking for
the dance of reason and record the whole dance of life. [Pp. 260-61]

Schlegel's subject, a relatively small slice of Duxbury's, was
largely unknown until Schlegel's publication of a series of articles,
now reworked and expanded in this book. His subject is the empirical legal research done by some, but by no means all, of the historical legal realists - including Dean Charles E. Clark, William 0.
Douglas, W. Underhill Moore, Walter Wheeler Cook, Herman
Oliphant, Leon Marshall, and Hessel Yntema. 66 So important was
65. Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law.
66. Schlegel is certainly free to study whatever scholars, or groups of scholars, he sees fit,
and the Columbia-Yale-Johns Hopkins focus makes obvious sense. But I fear his pique at
Karl Llewellyn's disparaging remarks about the empirical work of his en/ant protl!ge
Underhill Moore and that of the Hopkins quartet, see pp. 146, 200, has led him to slight
Llewellyn's place in the story he is telling of realist involvement with the social sciences.
When describing how the focus of his own work would be different from that of William
Twining's 1973 study of Llewellyn, see TWINING, supra note 23, Schlegel writes: "Since Llewellyn's major interests were jurisprudence and commercial law, (Twining's] biography could
not have given a central place to empirical research by the Realists because Llewellyn never
really engaged in any." P. 6 (emphasis supplied).
While it is certainly true that the amount of empirical research done by Llewellyn was not
of the same order as that of, say, Moore or Clark, Schlegel appears to have forgotten about
KARL LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HoEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941), or the numerous
summers in the late 1940s that Llewellyn did field work among the Pueblo in the American
Southwest, yielding, admittedly, little other than "extensive field notes." TWINING, supra
note 23, at 359. See generally Wolfgang Fikentscher, Die Erforschung des lebenden Rechts in
einer multikulturellen Gesel/schaft: Karl N. L/ewellyns Cheyenne- und Pueblo-Studien, in
RECHTSREALISMUS, MULTIKULTURELLE GESELLSCHAFT UNO HANDELSRECHT: KARL N.
LLEWELLYN UNO SEINE BEDEUTUNG HEUTE 45 (Ulrich Drobnig & Manfred Rehbinder eds.,
1994) [hereinafter DROBNIGIREHBINDER COLLECTION]. Naturally, this was not quantitative
work, but it nonetheless qualifies as "empirical." Schlegel perhaps might respond that, even
so, most of the data collection in each case was done by people other than Llewellyn himself.
See TWINING, supra note 23, at 155, 358. But the same also could be said about most, if not
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this work, Schlegel seems at times to suggest, that it may necessitate
a revision of our basic concept of what legal realism was, to bring it
in line with his view of intellectual history: "realism is best understood as something that the realists did." 67 At other points, he
seems less insistent on the sole correctness of defining realism in his
way and no other.6s
That is just as well. It would make no sense to me to exclude
the realists' jurisprudence, their most enduring contribution to
American law, from consideration altogether. Sensibly, Schlegel
does not do so. In principle I am either, as jurisprudential reader,
open to ha~g my understanding deepened by the presentation of
jurisprudential ideas set against the backdrop of a writer's whole
life and work, or, as nonjurisprudential reader, open to being told
an interesting nonjurisprudential story.
On my earlier schema, Schlegel's work probably would be described as a mixture of the clearly jurisprudential "Group Study"
(Type Seven) on the one hand, and the nonjurisprudential "Biography/Other Hat Worn" (Types Nine and Ten) on the other. Based
on his earlier programmatic credo, I am quite sure Professor Schlegel would not be bothered by a claim that his work was "not jurisprudence," on my fairly traditional understanding of the same.
all, of the realists Schlegel studies. Indeed, one aptly might describe the r~lationship between
Llewellyn and his Columbia junior colleague Hoebel in roughly the same way Schlegel conceives of the relations between Moore, Clark and William 0. Douglas, on the one hand, and
the professional social scientists Dorothy Thomas and Emma Corstvet on the other: providing technical expertise on social-scientific methodology. Even though Llewellyn and
Hoebel's field work among the Cheyenne would not satisfy the methodological requirements
of contemporary anthropology, see Flkentscher, supra, at 54-55, The Cheyenne Way can
nonetheless be said to have "inaugurated a new style of legal anthropology." Fikentscher,
supra, at 55.
Not precisely germane to Schlegel's observation on Llewellyn's engaging in empirical research, yet still obviously related, is Llewellyn's posthumously published RECHT, RECHTSLEBEN UNO GESELLSCHAFT, supra note 44, a theoretical work in which Llewellyn sought "to
'open up' the field of legal sociology, to offer it a possible program ..• tentatively proposing a
few daring hypotheses and 'fantasies' about the way legal sociology might eventually organize its observations of the 'life of the law' in the context of the larger society." Ansaldi, supra
note 47, at 746 (quoting LLEWELLYN, supra note 44). Perhaps Schlegel would count this as
"cheerleading" for empirical social science, but such a characterization only would tend to
assimilate Llewellyn to one of Schlegel's subjects, Walter Wheeler Cook. One wonders, in
fact, whether any realist of the period, with the possible exception of Moore, thought about
social science as systematically as Llewellyn did in this 1932 work. All in all, it is rather odd
for one whose primary reputation abroad is for his sociolo·gy of law, see William Twining, The
Idea of Juristic Method: A Tribute to Karl Llewellyn, in DROBNIG/REHBINDER COLLECTION,
supra, 11, 72-73, Schlegel, pp. 45-186 passim, to figure so queerly in a work on American
legal realism and the social sciences, empirical and otherwise.
67. P. 2. The phrase seems to echo Llewellyn's famous sentence in the Bramble Bush
lectures, "What these [legal] officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself."
LLEWELLYN, supra note 46, at 3.
68. "I suppose that there is nothing wrong with jurisprudes discussing Realism as jurisprudence, timeless answers to what are taken as timeless questions. For historians, though, it
is a matter of some consequence whether Realism is seen as a jurisprudence rather than
Realists[] as having or sharing a jurisprudence." P. 4.
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Whether his work tilts toward one or the other end of the spectrum
will depend on whether I think the nonjurisprudential material he
presents illuminates my understanding of ideas. If it does not, or
not primarily, the burden falls on him to show why I should be interested in his material. Perhaps his story is intrinsically interesting;
perhaps it manifestly bears on other important concerns of academic lawyers; perhaps Schlegel's analysis exposes some latent
bearing on those concerns.
Clark and Douglas: The realist social scientists named above all
were associated with Columbia, Yale and Johns Hopkins, or some
combination thereof. Charles Clark and William 0. Douglas of
Yale each began his empirical work in connection with some progressive law reform project. In Clark's case, it was procedural reform. The perceived need for such reform reflected in part a widely
shared belief that "procedure was too technical and complicated
and, as a result, allowed lawyers imbued with 'the sporting theory
of justice' to avoid decisions on the merits of claims by playing procedural games" (p. 83). The narrow topic of Clark's project, on
which he collaborated with Douglas, was the adjudication of civil
cases by Connecticut courts. In the course of this work he learned
of and ultimately adopted some of the values of the newly quantifying social sciences.
After a few months of field work, he concluded that state court
civil litigation "was largely administrative," and he found that "jury
trials were infrequent" (p. 83). From this, Clark "wonder[ed] about
the appropriateness of using complex judicial machinery to resolve
such apparently simple disputes" (p. 83). He later expanded his
study to courts outside Connecticut, to criminal cases, and to a
longer time period.
The results of the study of criminal cases flew in the face of the
conventional wisdom: rather than finding widespread delay,
"eighty-five percent of the cases were disposed in two months"
(p. 89). In fact, Clark consistently concluded that the criminal process was almost too efficient. The study's sponsors, however, who
had vested interests in the original reformist thesis, excluded these
findings from the final report. On the civil side, two findings - that
federal courts' diversity jurisdiction accounted for under twenty
percent of filed cases and that those that were filed were fairly simple cases - upset some sponsors and delighted others, depending
on the types of reforms they endorsed. The data also showed that
" [e]ssentially uncontested matters - collections, divorces, and foreclosures - together with the largely settled matters, primarily tort
cases, dominated the docket" (p. 92). Such evidence, however,
proved "by and large irrelevant to the cause of reform as [Clark and
his collaborators] knew it, since in a system where most cases are

May 1996)

Jurisprudential Writing

1543

uncontested or settled, technical procedure played little part, and
thus to expend effort at its reform made little sense" (p. 92).
Schlegel describes Clark's ensuing bewilderment and disappointment over the sponsors' conclusions that:
the fact that Clark's fact gathering was a "scientific" enterprise made
no difference. Fact gathering that did not advance an immediate reform objective was scholarship not worth publishing, just as fact gathering that did not fit their model of how the world was structured was
an "irrelevant jumble of figures." They would give or withhold their
support for the newer empirical research in law just as they had for
the older, less structured research. [pp. 97-98]

Clark undertook another empirical study, this time of the compensation received by auto accident victims, while Douglas studied
business failures and focused in particular on the administration of
the bankruptcy laws. Two nonlawyer professional social scientists
- Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Emma Corstvet - collaborated on
both projects, attempting to perfect the methodologies being followed. Yet lawyers and social scientists, Schlegel says, gradually
drifted apart: the lawyers were called away to seemingly more attractive activities, having proved less than fully willing to regard
facts as having much independent value, apart from some specific
purpose; the social scientists, on the other hand, remained chiefly
interested in making social observation a thoroughly professional,
quantitative science.
Johns Hopkins: One item of fallout from the "Deanship Crisis"
on the Columbia Law School faculty in 1928 - engendered when
Columbia's President Nicholas Murray Butler passed over Herman
Oliphant for the deanship - was the departure of Oliphant and
two colleagues, Hessel Yntema and economist Leon Marshall, for
Johns Hopkins University. There they joined Walter Wheeler
Cook, who was then in the process of planning "a nonteaching, research institute for law" (p. 147). Each of the four faculty members
"was to head up a 'practically independent' research unit" (p. 159).
The research projects ultimately would encompass a study of the
Ohio and Maryland court systems; litigation in New York; installment sales; and concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state
courts. In reality, however, these lawyers-empiricists generally
lacked a clear sense of the purpose of their ultimately short-lived
Institute. Schlegel's account indicates that there was not an enormous amount of enthusiasm among the four participants for actually doing empirical research of the sort that Clark and Douglas
would be doing at Yale. That lack of enthusiasm, coupled with the
administrative chores associated with a newly founded institution,
the absence of secure funding, the incomprehension and jealousy of
the rest of the Hopkins faculty, and the Depression, ultimately
killed the Institute off.
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Underhill Moore: Perhaps the most impressive achievement of
Schlegel's book is its revisionist account of Underhill Moore - professor first at Columbia, then at Yale. Both Moore and Cook, as
Schlegel describes them, belonged to one of the first generations of
law teachers whose professional identity was as academics who
were supposed to participate in the grand scholarly enterprise of
keeping the post-Langdell formalist edifice of the law in good repair (pp. 25-26). Their lives ran parallel in other ways as well, their
paths often crossing. They both began their careers in "colonial
service" at law schools west of the Hudson and east of the Rockies
doing traditional sorts of scholarship, then each gradually worked
his way back to "civilization" on the East Coast (p. 67). Also, they
jointly encountered the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey at Columbia, and that shared experience changed both their professional
lives: Cook became a cheerleader for law and the social sciences,
while Moore sloughed off his law professor identity and assumed
that of a social-scientist wannabe (pp. 24-25, 57-62). Indeed, of all
the realist lawyers who did social science work, Moore, in Schlegel's
account, took most seriously the methodological demands of the
field, and he thus broke free of the nexus between empirical research and reform.
Before the Schlegelian rehabilitation, it is safe to say that many
people regarded Moore as a sort of law professor-madman, sitting
outside in shorts and pith helmet counting cars. Schlegel's not inconsiderable achievement is to have converted our reaction from
ridicule to pity, and perhaps even to outright sympathy. In all
Moore's empirical research - from his study of banks' debiting of
direct discounts and bank practices on recrediting stopped certified
checks, to the famous parking studies - his methodological understanding of the social sciences grew progressively more sophisticated, whether he was studying the relation between law and
custom or applying stimulus-response psychology to law-related behavior. This sophistication came about in part through his collaboration with Thomas and Corstvet, whose advice, admittedly, he did
not always follow. But the rub was that he was lonely and misunderstood: the other Yale law professors at best did not understand
him and at worst mocked him, and the professional social scientists
at Yale's Institute for Human Relations considered him an amateur.

* * *
I have barely outlined the "story" Schlegel tells about the empirical work done by legal realists. A number of essentially set
pieces that help to provide context fore and aft accompany his tale;
they include sections on the professionalization of law teaching, the
"colonial service," and the last chapter on the not particularly edifying subsequent history of social science research in American law
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schools. All are illuminating and well done. Schlegel also must be
commended for his expanded definition of the realist controversy,
which includes not just the Llewellyn-Pound debate, but also the
earlier Columbia Law Review symposium on Jerome Frank's Law
and the Modern Mind. 69
But again I must revert to my starting point. Schlegel's book is
not jurisprudence, or even jurisprudential history, in anything approaching a classical sense. Truthfully, I do not find it to have
thrown much of a sidelight on jurisprudential ideas as such. But
such was not his intent. If I read his book through different spectacles, I find much that is quite interesting, including, most especially,
his above-mentioned set pieces and his own analyses of his collected data, placed at the end of each of the three middle chapters.
On the other hand, there is all that data itself, narrative and
personal detail. Must we really be frogmarched through every last
letter and memo of anyone who ever wrote on any aspect of the
Hopkins Institute, and through every last methodological problem
in questionnaire design? After a while, it gets to be about as stimulating as biblical genealogy. While Professor Schlegel disclaims any
desire "to do a von Ranke" (p. 12), his presentation of such voluminous data, in his effort to show us wie es eigentlich war, is nonetheless quite Germanic in its power to overwhelm with detailed
thoroughness. Quite frankly, a lot of it is not very interesting and
easily could have been condensed without any loss of confidence in
the subsequent discussion and analysis. The book also needed a
good copy editing. But it would be churlish to end on the warts; so
instead I will finish by stating that students of realism, and of legal
academe moF generally, are in Schlegel's debt for his rescue of
realism's forgotten legacy.

69. See Law and the Modern Mind: A Symposium, 31 CoLUM. L. REV. 82 (1931).

